Bank manager moves to a new bank. Firms A and B are part of her portfolio, firm A follows herAbstract
Bank loan officers accumulate information and build personal relationships that can shape credit allocation. Using Italian administrative data, we directly measure these relationships by linking bank managers to their portfolios of client firms and tracking managers as they move across banks. When a manager switches employers, firms in her prior portfolio become 3.7 percentage points more likely to establish a lending relationship with her new bank four years later, more than three times the baseline probability. Manager portability lowers firms’ switching costs without generating adverse selection. Firms that follow their managers obtain lower interest rates than on their previous loans, while paying rates similar to those of other new borrowers at the same bank. Moreover, portability does not come at the cost of loan quality: their loans are no more likely to become nonperforming.
Presented at
Capital Theory Seminar, Yiran Fan Memorial Conference, Experimental Seminar Series, Applied Micro Student Seminar, AMT Student Seminar (University of Chicago) • EEA Congress (Bordeaux) • PhD Conference in memory of Denis Gromb (HEC Paris) • EDGE Jamboree (Cambridge) • Department of Finance Seminar, Food 4 Thought, Finance Brown Bag (Bocconi University) • Milan PhD workshop (Bicocca University) • Finest Autumn Workshop (University of Milan) • Labor and Finance Group (Berlin-Halle Iwh)
Enrico Stivella
Postdoctoral Scholar in Economics
Mostly doing research in Economics of Science, Innovation and Human Capital. If not, playing basketball or getting lost in the mountains.